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Background: The inﬂuence of sociocultural factors on human reliability within an open sociotechnical
systems is highlighted. The design of such systems is enhanced by experience feedback.
Methods: The study was focused on a survey related to the observation of working cases, and by pro-
cessing of incident/accident statistics and semistructured interviews in the qualitative part. In order to
consolidate the study approach, we considered a schedule for the purpose of standard statistical mea-
surements. We tried to be unbiased by supporting an exhaustive list of all worker categories including
age, sex, educational level, prescribed task, accountability level, etc. The survey was reinforced by a
schedule distributed to 300 workers belonging to two oil companies. This schedule comprises 30 items
related to six main factors that inﬂuence human reliability.
Results: Qualitative observations and schedule data processing had shown that the sociocultural factors
can negatively and positively inﬂuence operator behaviors.
Conclusion: The explored sociocultural factors inﬂuence the human reliability both in qualitative and
quantitative manners. The proposed model shows how reliability can be enhanced by some measures
such as experience feedback based on, for example, safety improvements, training, and information.
With that is added the continuous systems improvements to improve sociocultural reality and to reduce
negative behaviors.
Copyright  2016, Occupational Safety and Health Research Institute. Published by Elsevier. This is an
open access article under the CC BY-NC-ND license (http://creativecommons.org/licenses/by-nc-nd/4.0/).1. Introduction
Humans have always occupied a signiﬁcant place in the design,
exploitation and maintenance of industrial systems. With techno-
logical advances, systems have become more sophisticated and
complex. This complexiﬁcation requires some abilities (cognitive,
sensorimotor, and intellectual) and knowledge that sometimes
exceed the limits of human operators. For example, the human
operator could be failing on more than one criterion (saturation,
loss of vigilance, tiredness, error, etc.).To that is added the con-
straints inherent in operator unsuitability to the technology of
these systems that are conceived within sociocultural setting with
no relationship to the local context. Such human failings are often
the origin of incidents that evolve into catastrophes and sometimesarch Laboratory, Institute of Health
).
pational Safety andHealth Researc
d/4.0/).have dramatic consequences not only for the operators and the
installations but also to nearby populations and even to the envi-
ronment. To prevent risks related to human error, several ap-
proaches to human reliability have been developed.
Since the 1950s, safety studies of industrial systems started to
take an interest in human error with the purpose of establishing
a quantiﬁable assessment allowing the calculation of the reli-
ability of the human operator as a simple component of the
system. Thus the ﬁrst quantiﬁed estimates of human reliability
were developed by Sandia National Laboratories, New Mexico,
Albuquerque, USA in 1952 [1], with the purpose of quantifying
the human error probabilities to build up evaluations, ex ante, of
human reliability and using these data to calculate the overall
system reliability.and Safety, University Hadj Lakhdar, 05000, Batna, Algeria.
h Institute. Published byElsevier. This is an open access article under the CCBY-NC-ND
Table 1
Schedule consistency and distribution
Companies
Studied workers Sex Nature of tasks
W1 W2 W3 M F T1 T2 T3
Sonatrach 50 50 50 138 12 62 58 30
ENTP 50 50 50 144 06 55 56 39
Total 100 100 100 282 18 117 114 69
T1, supervising and monitoring; T2, operation; T3, maintenance; W1, executive
managers; W2, supervisors; W3, skilled workers.
A. Laidoune and M.E.H. Rahal Gharbi / Human reliability within sociotechnical systems 195In the 1960s, the French Academy of Sciences accepted human
reliability as a discipline belonging to the engineering sciences.
Since then, studies have tried to build databases containing human
error rates. Within this context, the human error rates method of
prediction, technique for human error prediction was created in
1964 [2], followed by several similar methods such as technica
empirica stima errori operatori (TESEO) [3], success likelihood
method index (SLIM) [4], human error assessment and reduction
technique (HEART) [5], and human cognitive reliability (HCR) [6].
These constituted the ﬁrst generation [7] of methods based on
human error, by considering the human as a simple component of
the system characterized by failures that one can evaluate by
probabilistic approaches. The second generation of these method-
sdcognitive reliability and error analysis method (CREAM) [8], a
technique for human event analysis (ATHEANA) [9], and méthode
d’evaluation de la réalisation des missions opérateur pour la sûreté
(MERMOS) [10]dwere developed from the 1990s andwere focused
on cognitive processes to try to predict and explain human failures.
These methods tried to take into account some contextual factors
within the framework of a systemic approach. The third
generationdfunctional resonance analysismethod [11], barrier and
operational risk analysis [12], and other similar methods that
developed from the end of the 1990sdwere concerned with the
organizational environment of work and its role in the genesis of
human error.
The technicist approachdbased on the improvement of a sys-
tem’s overall reliability by the increase in the reliability of each one
of their componentsdconsiders the human a simple element of the
system, hoping to evaluate the human’s reliability as one evaluates
the reliability of any system component. This approach appears to
be outdated. This is in spite of their positive and undeniable con-
tributions in the assessment of human reliability in terms of error
prediction and quantiﬁcation, especially their contribution to the
improvement of maintainability and availability of systems. The
technicist approaches had reduced the accident effects and the
accident frequencies.
Nevertheless these tools had shown some limitations, because
they adopt reductive and mechanist views [13]. Their application is
heavy and complex, because they are based on arbitrary task di-
vision in elementary operations without taking into account the
interactions between the tasks [14] and the probabilistic assess-
ment is based on expert views and database extracts which differ in
context to one another.
Thus these tools were centered on assessment rather than on
reduction of human error risks because they are unaware of the
human operation-speciﬁc characteristics and did not focus on the
human operator negative aspects, hiding the operator’s positive
role especially in the recovery of incidental situations [15].
Many studies have highlighted the positive role of the human as
a reliability agent [1], such as the ability to innovate and to invent
new solutions according to situations, the expectation and recovery
of failures, the adaptation to various unusual situations, the fast
selection of relevant information, and the ability to synthesize and
reason. Therefore, any reliability approach must bypass the
comprehension of the human, in its thinking, its representations,
its interactions with its environment, and its reactions when faced
with constraints.
The comprehension of human conduct requires taking into
consideration several factors such as personality, affectivity,
cognitive function registers, cognitive styles, culture, training, and
social environment.
The approach should tackle the issue of human reliability within
a widened framework, by considering the studied system as being
an open sociotechnical system on the external environment (social
organization, economic, cultural, etc.) because this approach willnot have to be limited to negative aspects (errors, maladjustment)
but will have to be focused on operator strengths (recovery,
correction, expectation).
In this article, we will try to emphasize the relevance of the
inﬂuence of sociocultural factors on the operator reliability of the
humanemachine systemwithin an open environment because the
interactions of the elements composing the system cannot be
considered within a closed system.We have limited these factors to
six main ones in order to consolidate our in-site survey. This choice
is justiﬁed by the theories of social psychology, the sociology of
organizations, and by the works of the French Foundation for In-
dustrial Security Culture. The selected factors are: standards and
social values; group culture; commitment, mobilization, and cul-
ture of safety; socioeconomic environment; resistance to change;
and the inﬂuence of the use of new information and communica-
tion technologies (NICT).
2. Materials and methods
For the site survey, we chose two major Algerian oil companies
with large workforces. They were Sonatrach/DP Hassi Messaoud,
Algeria, and ENTP (National Company for Oil Wells) Hassi Mes-
saoud, Algeria. In accordance with the objective of the research, we
initially adopted a qualitative approach centered on work cases.
These observations let us foresee deviations in operator behavior
when executing prescribed tasks. We also considered the statistical
analysis of incidents/accidents which occurred following human
errors and semistructured interviews with some of the managers
that are accountable on managing systems showing all signiﬁcant
risks.
In order to consolidate the study approach, wemade a schedule,
through which we tried to be unbiased by supporting all workers
categories according to their age, sex, education level, prescribed
task, accountability level, etc. This schedule is made up of 30 items,
each item comprises two parts: one closed question (yes or no)
about the adoption of such behavior towards a given situation; if
the response is positive then the operator is called to choose the
sociocultural factors having motivated his behavior.
The sample took into consideration 300 workers distributed as
shown in Table 1.
The average age of the executive managers was 38 years, that of
the supervisors was 44 years, and that of the skilled workers was 46
years. The executive managers were from specialized institutes or
from universities, supervisors were from certain specialized in-
stitutes and skilled workers came from training centers or
institutes.
While choosing standard measurements to calculate the per-
centage of the behaviors adopted by the operators (positive and
negative) and the part of the sociocultural factors which justiﬁed
the adoption of such behaviors, it became quantitatively foresee-
able to estimate the behaviors that are revealing in the assessment
of human reliability and that are likely to be inﬂuenced by the
sociocultural factors characterizing the local context.
Table 2
Schedule counting showing the level of inﬂuence of sociocultural factors on worker behavior
Behaviors inﬂuencing reliability
Worker categories Relative % of operators having noticed the inﬂuence of
sociocultural factors on their conduct
W1 W2 W3 Total %* F1 F2 F3 F4 F5 F6 F7
Negative behavior
Recourse to informal methods 35 48 52 135 45 52 45 35 40 47 2 7
Fatalism versus risk 11 27 70 108 36 60 55 30 35 42 0 2
Codes & languages misunderstanding 3 22 113 138 46 55 22 25 9 30 0 3
Bad awareness of risk 9 48 90 147 49 44 53 55 12 22 15 7
Inappropriate decisions 15 25 86 126 42 47 53 48 23 32 4 2
Prescribed rules breaking 12 36 85 135 45 62 58 53 54 57 11 5
Deviance ﬂoating 6 57 87 150 50 59 52 54 43 23 6 3
Risk taking 8 42 91 141 47 45 55 53 45 33 8 4
Demotivation & commitment lack 23 52 81 156 52 45 55 34 44 25 0 2
Leading new techniques to fail 12 24 75 111 37 49 48 33 12 52 0 2
Work botching 51 44 22 117 39 35 46 45 42 39 7 4
Distraction & loss of vigilance 55 56 51 162 54 12 11 35 10 12 44 3
Positive behavior
Rules adaptation to ambient context 38 51 49 138 46 52 44 43 40 2 0 2
Anomalies recovery 39 29 64 132 44 23 25 55 45 0 5 3
Use of informal know-how 9 13 113 135 45 44 39 38 15 9 7 2
Cooperation & coordination 55 60 80 195 65 22 45 43 5 0 12 3
Collective strategy against risk 56 57 76 189 63 15 52 47 12 0 15 4
Communicating by informal codes 9 32 82 123 41 22 35 27 10 12 9 4
Commitment & mobilization 60 55 41 156 52 24 26 55 40 0 14 3
Skills transmission between colleagues 66 65 73 204 68 25 56 41 20 0 12 4
Discipline & self-control 68 65 44 177 59 22 35 45 22 0 15 3
* Percentage of operators having adopted this behavior.
F1, social values; F2, social group; F3, safety culture; F4, socioeconomic conditions; F5, the resistance to change; F6, new information and communication technologies; F7,
another case being considered by the asked operator; W1, executive managers; W2, supervisors; W3, skilled workers.
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The schedule data processing summarized in Table 2 details the
worker categories that participated and their stanceswith respect to
the sociocultural factors having inﬂuenced their reliability. These
results conﬁrm clearly that there are certain deviations between the
prescribed tasks deﬁned by the system designers and the actual
activity of the operators according to the collected answers. Thus,
these factors are ascertained as a determinant of operator reliability.
3.1. Standards and social values
In a country such as Algeria, the industrial facilities are always
imported in turnkey form; the issue of worker maladjustment ari-
ses because this technology is conceived elsewhere.
Through our on-site observations, we noticed that a huge part of
the human errors at the origin of incidents having caused distur-
bances in work (quality defects, breakdowns, beginnings of ﬁre,
light injuries), are related to low awareness of risks, and of false
representations on conducts when faced with a dangerous
situation.
This can be explained by the individual acquired culture which
determines its manner of acting when faced with a risk [16]. Thus,
some workers minimally trained on risk prevention resort to
antiquated beliefs, which reduces their ability to evaluate potential
risks [1].
Standards and social issues that negatively inﬂuenced human
reliability were: return to informal processes (traditional know-
how); recourse to fatalism (religion, tradition) to reject the pro-
tection means; difﬁculties in comprehension due to language and
code (knowing that the majority of the workers only speak Arabic);
breaking of certain prescribed rules that appear to them as not in
conformance with their culture; making poor decisions because of
the representations which they had on the risky situations.
Factors positively inﬂuencing human reliability included using
symbols and codes as shortcuts to simplify tasks, using workers’
mother tongue to improve communication, and using traditional
know-how.3.2. Group culture
The group is seen as the most signiﬁcant component in the
working staff. Some is the educational level of the operator which
tries always to belong to a group (trade unions, work colleagues,
ethnic groups, and so).
Throughout our observations of various task execution within
the various activities of Algerian oil companies, we noted that 45%
of operators are inﬂuenced by their group’s informal standards.
This caused the companies to adopt some behaviors affecting the
system reliability negatively: neglecting some prescribed rules to
observe certain unwritten rules that are adopted by the group;
informal distribution of tasks among the group members [17]; and
risk taking and standardization of some deviances, with an aim of
taking shortcuts to save time and effort.
However, the group inﬂuence can have positive effects on hu-
man reliability, such as: skill transmission by interactions between
the group members; cooperation in the recovery of the anomalies;
ease of communication and information exchange; and appren-
ticeship of some positive values that can improve safety.
3.3. Commitment, mobilization, and culture of safety
The companies are social systems, which are characterized by
speciﬁcities shaping their cultures. Then, each company endeavors
to develop a strategy aiming to channel energies in order to
mobilize individuals with adhesion to its collective project.
During the survey, we noted that the operators mobilization
degree to the company safety policy goals differs according to
factors such as the size of the company and the operator’s experi-
ence, age, and training level.
In large companies such as Sonatrach, most operators are
convinced by the safety requirements and show their interest in the
observance of these rules and guidelines. This can be explained by:
the implication of the hierarchy to setting up of the culture of safety
[18]; the climate of safety that reigns in workplaces; the inﬂuence
of the work staff, which exerts a kind of informal control on newly
hired workers; and operators’ positive commitment thanks to the
Fig. 2. Relevance of positive behavior adopted by workers.
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Health and Safety Commission and labor unions.
By contrast, in other companies such as ENTP, we found that few
of the operators are convinced by the utility of the safety re-
quirements. The others think that these rules and guidelines are
barriers to their actions. This can be explained by a weak culture of
safety, a lack of training and information on risk prevention,
especially for young workers, and a hierarchy that shows little in-
terest in prevention programs.
3.4. Socioeconomic environment
Several studies (Tavistoc Institute, Faverge, France) [19] consider
the company as an open sociotechnical system, organized in
interindependent elements. The company’s external environment
(geographical situation, sources of natural or different risks) as well
as the internal situation (ﬁnancial position, hiring mode, social
policy), exert a real inﬂuence on the operators’ behaviors towards
risks.
During our work, we realized that in the small companies that
perform some work by subcontracting with Sonatrach the workers,
considering their unsteady state (the majority are on ﬁxed-term
contracts), try to save possible company expenditure with regard
to setting of actions related to risks prevention or to facilities
maintenance.
Among these behaviors, we found the following: ignorance of
prescribed deadlines concerning installation maintenance, such as
changing of crane cables, tires, or fuel dumps; adoption of risky
operations in order to save time; not carrying some protection
equipment to save expense; and intervention on moving machines
to maintain them while not disturbing the production process.
This situation is worsened by the absence of a representative
from the Health and Safety Commission, occupational medicine
service, or labor union intervening in the safety and health at the
work site.
Another important social aspect that inﬂuences the workers’
reliability and performance is working far from the family location.
We found that the majority of the workers lived far from their
places of work. They work 12 hours per day for 4 weeks withoutFig. 1. Relevance of negative behavior adopted by workers.interruption and then rest for the next 4weeks.Working away from
family is a source of psychosocial disorders, resulting in potentially
risky behavior, (nervousness, excitation, tiredness, stress,
depression).
3.5. Resistance to change
The resistance to change is a phenomenon characterizing indi-
vidual and group behavior. This phenomenon is an expression of
rejection of all that is new. Maurers [20] considers this phenome-
non as a natural one and is a current attitude, he considers it also as
the least-known source and the most signiﬁcant in the change
failure.
InAlgerian companies in general and theoil companies thatwere
the subject of our study, we realized that a majority of workers see
change as a symptom of a questionable future, of destruction of the
existing and of a confrontation with the unknown.
With regard to our subject, the resistance to change can result in
the following: the rejection of new more automated and protected
working methods, to remain bound to old methods that are much
focused on the manual operator intervention; the refusal to carry
new protection equipment and continued use of old equipment;
the development of defensive strategies by all the working staff in
order to fail the new safety requirements; and the adoption of some
passive behavior in anomalies recovery to prove the inefﬁciency of
the new procedures.
We can adhere to the ideas of Coch and French [21]: “the
resistance to change results from one combination, at the same
time, of the individual reactions, related to a frustration feeling
and collective reactions resulting from the group induced forces.”
3.6. The inﬂuence of the use of NICT
Generally there are positive results from the use of NICT and of
the internet in particular on an organization’s operation. These
tools made it possible to facilitate information exchanges in a large
quantity efﬁciently [22]. Indeed, their advantages are many and
difﬁcult to quantify such as: the avoidance cost, collective creativity
and the cooperativework; the contacts widening; and access to real
information sources.
Fig. 3. Sociocultural systems design model.
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example, intrusion risks and risk of data leakage, ﬁnancial swindles
and the spreading of fanatic ideas. Here, we focused on the inﬂu-
ence of NICT, and especially that of social networks.
Thus, through our observations, and after the schedule exploi-
tation, we found that a great number of the workers state to have
used a mobile phone or computer internet service from their work
station to reach social networks or to use the internet. In spite of the
role of this gathering of useful information for the completion of
work for certain tasks, nevertheless, the negative results of such use
on operator reliability and performance are proven, which will be
reﬂected on the total system reliability. Negative results include the
waste of work time, the negligence of some alerts because of the
operators focusing on these networks, the work botching in a hasty
manner, which will inﬂuence quality, and the loss of attention and
vigilance that will generate incidents, or even serious accidents.4. Discussion
The results gained from the analysis of workers schedule an-
swers conﬁrmed the same trends as observed at the time of site
surveys. These results showed that only the sociocultural factors
are liable in 45% of cases, of some attitudes and negative conducts
inﬂuencing the reliability of the human operator during the
execution of its task. Among which one can quote adherence to old
methods, rejection of new techniques, lack of attention and risk
taking, the hasty decisions inﬂuenced by the context, disengage-
ment and demotivation (Fig. 1). This does not exclude the positive
contribution in 54% of cases of some sociocultural factors, for
example, the setting of a positive safety culture, based on the
cooperation between the working staff, the know-how appren-
ticeship, the imposing of certain positive informal rules within the
group, the various adaptations and incidents recoveries (Fig. 2).
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relevance of sociocultural factors in the individual’s acquired
culture, and in determining their way of thinking and acting
towards risk [23]. Thus the improvement of human reliability
should not be done without the assumption of liability of these
factors, within the framework of a wider social organization
regarding the company as an open sociotechnical system in the
environment.
Finally, we can join the idea developed by Dejoy [18], according
to which the individual’s commitment to prevention programs is
not solely determined by the threat against risks, but by the
awareness of prevention programs, the application of these pro-
grams, the social environment in which they evolve, and by the
level of the hierarchy involvement in setting of the safety culture.
This limited study can be extended to a huge number of companies
or to focus workers subcategories to highlight the main subcate-
gory that is causing the most negative behaviors.5. Conclusion
The explored sociocultural factors, considering the man as an
unforeseeable element of an open sociotechnical system, are
inﬂuencing its reliability both qualitatively and quantitatively.
This was reached when noticing that technicist methods are
limited because the human being is as such but not as a technical
element of the system on which we can apply recovery loops in
case of errors, for example. The human being is more than that:
its behavior cannot be adjustable by a technical process and it has
the ability to expect or to recover from itself. That is to say that
the theory is very far from practice when the element is a human
being because the latter is the holder of noticeable eigenvalues,
such as resistance to change, that any other technical element
cannot have because the technical element follows a strictly
known path. Thus, this work highlights the most likely sociocul-
tural factors inﬂuencing the human reliability as indicators (cues).
They were determined by in-site observation, by incidents/acci-
dents, and their inﬂuencing degree was estimated by a
questionnaire.
With this intention, it would be advisable that the designers
of sociotechnical systems do forecast the following: (i) experi-
ment feedbacks to correct defects that will be detected during
the production operation, while making facilities readjustment
to the requirements of the parent population (e.g., anthropom-
etry, language, religion, culture, climate); (ii) a safety manage-
ment system, based on the development of a positive integrated
culture of safety; (iii) error tolerant systems allowing anomalies
recoveries; and training and information policy to improve risk
awareness.
We propose the three-level model shown in Fig. 3, which clearly
illustrates this inﬂuence. It operates in the following way. Level 1
depicts the most known sociocultural factors that inﬂuence the
taskeperson interaction in two ways: a direct way that has an
impact on behavior and conduct; and an indirect way which affects
human thinking mode and its method of resolving issues. Level 2
depicts the consequences of these factors on taskeperson interac-
tion thatmanifest themselves (positively and negatively) on human
reliability. Level 3 feedback depicts the corrective actions and en-
hancements that could be done by supporting the training, the
culture of security, and the information and adaptations that take
into consideration the cultural speciﬁcities, for example, when
conceiving systems.
This model can be useful when applying feedbacks, and thus can
lead to the following: the success of technology transfer; theenhancement of systems design when adapting them to operator
culture; a better design of user interfaces; and the anomalies re-
covery that makes systems more reliable.
On the human factors side, themodel proposes only that actions,
such as training and information, must be taken to dispose of
resistance to change and other negative conducts conveyed by so-
ciocultural factors. It proposes also the reinforcing of a culture of
security to make operators pay more attention to rules and security
orders.
Thus, we can state that taking into consideration the sociocul-
tural factors in reliability studies will lead to a better mastering of
risks that decrease incidents/accidents and shutdowns, decreasing
the production cost and enhancing the quality. The work climate
will be better and make communication easier, there will be
improved cooperation and the coordination between workers,
motivation will increase, and lead to fewer labor disputes (strikes).
Finally, although this analysis testing is limited, two major oil
companies with large work forces were studied in order to explore
the most responsible sociocultural factors. We hope that the anal-
ysis can be extended to a large number of companies and to more
worker subcategories.
As a perspective, we foresee that this analysis will be a reference
in human reliability research studies that should take into
consideration these highlighted factors in various methods and
tools to assess the human reliability.
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